Mercer Law Review
Volume 46
Number 2 Federal Judicial Independence
Symposium

Article 8

3-1995

The Fragmentation of Federal Rules
Erwin Chemerinsky
Barry Friedman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
Chemerinsky, Erwin and Friedman, Barry (1995) "The Fragmentation of Federal Rules," Mercer Law Review:
Vol. 46 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol46/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

The Fragmentation of Federal

Rules
Erwin Chemerinsky
and
Barry Friedman"
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. Their
adoption represented a triumph of uniformity over localism. The lengthy
debate that prefaced the adoption of the rules focused upon the value of
a national set of rules, as opposed to the then-governing practice of
"conformity," in which local federal practice mirrored that of the state in
which the federal courts sat. Although many different arguments were
offered in favor of the federal rules, at bottom the rules' proponents
carried the day by arguing that procedure ought to be the same across
the federal courts and the cases those courts heard.1
Almost sixty years later, the central accomplishment of uniform
federal rules is in serious jeopardy. The trend today is away from
uniformity and toward localism, though perhaps not consciously so. The
federal rules themselves permit individual district courts to enact their
own local rules.2 While concern about the impact of local rules upon the
uniformity of the system of federal rules is long standing, recent years
have seen a proliferation in these local rules. Although the ostensible
* Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center.
Northwestern University (B.S., 1975); Harvard University (J.D., 1978).
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. University of Chicago (BAk, 1978);
Georgetown University (J.D., 1982).
The Authors wish to thank the participants in the faculty workshop at the University
of Florida School of Law for their helpful comments.
1. On the enactment of the Federal Rules and the debate about localism versus
uniformity, see Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:
Uniformity, Divergence,and EmergingProceduralPatterns,137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989).
2. PFz. R.Civ. P. 83.
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purpose of these rules'is not to disrupt national rule uniformity, that
often is their impact. Then, in 1990, Congress adopted the Civil Justice
Reform Act ("CJRA7).' The purpose of the CJRA is to achieve broad
based reforms in the way federal civil cases are handled by lawyers and
the courts. The primary mechanism of the CJRA, however, is individual
rulemaking by the ninety-four separate district courts and their adjunct
advisory committees established under the CJRA to effect reform.4
Further, in 1993 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in
significant ways, particularly with regard to discovery procedure.
Framed against the backdrop of the CJRA, the discovery amendments
offer an opt-out for any district court that chooses not to participate.
Many district courts have taken this option, formulating their own
variant of the discovery process. 5 Thus, discovery also now operates
quite differently in each district.
This fragmentation of procedure is not motivated by a strong drive
toward localism. Almost no one is heard to offer support for the notion
that the fundamental decision made in 1938 ought to be reversed.
Rather, the current trend toward localism appears to be a by-product of
a much broader concern about the direction and process of civil litigation
generally." The perception is that federal civil litigation is facing a
crisis of burgeoning dockets and escalating costs.' Lacking strong
central leadership, individual districts adopted local rules to address
these perceived problems. Congress, caught in the reform fervor, also
opted for local solutions. The Judicial Conference, when it tried its hand
at reform, felt it had little choice but to continue the trend.
Whatever the impetus for the movement to localism, a topic we discuss
below, its result can hardly be gainsaid. A study of local rules made
seven years ago found some 5,000 local rules in existence, many of them
at variance with the federal rules, not to mention one another.' The
CJRA expressly invites every one of the ninety-four districts to adopt its
own model of how federal litigation should proceed, dealing with such

3. The Civil Justice Reform Act was part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). The Civil Justice Reform Act is codified at 28

U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. II 1990).
4. See infra notes 34-102 and accompanying text.

5. See infra notes 193-16 and accompanying text.
6. For a pointed critique of civil justice reform efforts generally, see Stephen B.
Burbank, Ignorance and ProceduralLaw Reform: A Call for Moratorium, 59 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 841 (1993).
7. On the question of rising litigation costs see A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers,
Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219 (1985).
8. See Subrin, supra note 1, at 2020 (describing the Judicial Conference's 1988 Local
Rules Project).
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important topics as case management, tracking for different cases,
motion practice, and alternative dispute resolution. Early results
display a tremendous disuniformity among federal districts, and
increasing variance from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
impact of the opt-out provisions of the 1993 Civil Rules Amendments is
of like effect. Some seventy years ago, during the long conversation
about uniform federal rules, one commentator stated that "tlhere is no
more excuse for differing judicial procedure than for differing languages
in the several States.' Despite the apparent kernel of sense in this
statement, today the proliferation of local rules and the trend to local
models of adjudication threaten to turn federal practice into a veritable
Tower of Babel in which no court follows the process of any sister court.
In this Article we critique the movement to localism in rulemaking.
In doing so, we put largely to one side the very difficult and very
controversial questions of whether there is a litigation "crisis" in the
federal courts, whether procedural reform can or will address that crisis,
and whether any particular procedure is a good one. Rather, our focus
is on the somewhat more limited but perhaps ultimately most important
question of whether it really is a good idea for every district court in the
country to go its own way in developing civil process. Our answer,
simply put, is no. The ill-considered and unmanaged proliferation of
local rules is likely to exacerbate any problems there are with civil
litigation. Different procedural rules will have an impact upon
substantive justice. Varying procedures will lead to forum shopping,
unnecessary cost, and widespread confusion. Amidst strong arguments
against localism in rulemaking, there is almost no serious argument that
supports it.
In Part I of this Article we detail the trend toward localism in
rulemaking, treating principally the development of local rules, the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, and the 1993 Amendments to the Civil
Rules. This Part describes the movement toward localism, and discusses
some of the motivations that prompt it. In Part II we make the case for
federal uniformity and against localism. In this Part we explain why
fragmentation of procedure is likely to cause harm to the federal district
court system and the litigants that rely upon it. In Part III we take up
and respond to the arguments that are advanced in favor of localism.
We conclude that for the most part those arguments have little or no
merit and certainly on balance do not justify the escalating trend we are
seeing toward localism. Finally, we conclude by offering a proposal to
centralize rulemaking authority, while allowing some room when

9.

Thomas Shelton, 30 LAW NOTES 50, 52 (1926).
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variance is desirable or experimentation is required.
One ray of hope amidst the confusion of local rulemaking is a
provision in the CJRA that ultimately requires the Judicial Conference
to make recommendations based upon the experiences of the many
district courts with their own CJRA plans. 10 This provision seems to
treat at least part of the current trend toward localism as temporary
only; a brief study period before adoption of new uniform rules. Below
we express serious concern with the CJRA's methodology in this regard,
pointing out that the scientific nature of the enterprise is illusory.
Nonetheless, there is promise in the mandate of subsequent review with
an eye toward uniformity. It is our considered hope and judgment that
after several years of procedural fragmentation, the future holds an
opportunity to collect all the pieces and reverse the trend, once again
imposing procedural uniformity upon the federal courts.
II.

THE TREND TO LOCALISM

A

Manifestations of the Trend
An increasing array of important procedural issues are now dealt with
in federal courts in a local, rather than a national fashion. Generally,
this means that the judges in each federal district collectively make a
decision as to specific procedures to be followed within that district.
Sometimes, the procedures are even more localized with individual
judges deciding the rules to be followed in their courtrooms. Overall, the
result is that uniformity among federal districts and sometimes within
them has been increasingly replaced by divergence.
There are many manifestations of this trend towards localism. Most
notably, the development of local rules of procedure, the Civil Justice
Reform Act, and the recent amendments to the discovery provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure all have contributed to the
increasing diversity in procedures in federal courts across the country.
1. Local Rules. The Rules Enabling Act provides that the "Supreme

10. 28 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
11. In addition to local rules, individual judges often adopt their own "practices,"
further contributing to disuniformity of rules. For an article critical of individual judges'
practices see Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges' Practices: An
Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1
(1994). Similarly, commentary has been directed at the 'patchwork" of rules within each
district. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Can Systemic Ills Afflicting the
Federal Courts be Remedied by Local Rules, 67 ST. JOHI" L. REV. 721, 735-36 (1993).
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Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to
time prescribe rules for conduct of their business."' Thus, the Rules
Enabling Act clearly authorizes federal districts and federal courts of
appeals to promulgate rules of procedure for cases arising within their
jurisdictions. The Rules Enabling Act contains both substantive and
procedural limits on what these lower courts may do in their rules.
Substantively, all such rules must be consistent with acts of Congress
and with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, such as the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence."3 Procedurally, in adopting local rules, courts are required to
publish them in advance and allow time for public comment.14 Rules
adopted by a district can be abrogated by the judicial conference of the
circuit or by the Judicial Conference of the United States.'
Traditionally, local rules adopted by districts have dealt with
relatively minor matters, such as the size and type of paper to be
used.' In general, the local rules have handled practical aspects of
litigation not covered by the federal rules. Increasingly, however, local
rules deal with much more important aspects of court procedure, and
there is enormous variance among the districts. 7
Not surprisingly, local rules have become especially important in areas
where there have been great pressures for change in recent years:
discovery; settlement; and the use of alternative dispute resolution.
Concern about protracted litigation and a' desire for greater efficiency
have caused districts to adopt rules to better control discovery and to
find ways to dispose of cases without trials.'8 The discovery provisions

12. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994).

13. Id. ("Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and
procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title").
14. Id. § 2071(b).

15. Id. § 2071(c)(1).
16. For example, the local rules for the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California require that pleadings and motions be filed on numbered paper with
ruled lines at the left and right margins. See Local Rules of Practice for the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, Rule 120-1. Even as to these
relatively minor areas, we question the lack of uniformity. Attorneys in a single state must
vary their conduct in different districts in their state, to say nothing of attorneys engaged
in multi-state practice.

17. The most elaborate and stunning discussion of local rule disuniformity may be in
the Judicial Conference's Local Rules Project's 1988 Report, discussed in Subrin, supra note
1, at 2020-21. See also Comment, The Local Rules ofCivil Procedurein the FederalDistrict
Courts--A Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1011.

18. For a discussion of the reasons for the greater reliance on local rules, see text
accompanying notes 117-25.
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were revised in 1993 in response
to the same concerns.19 Districts also have tried on their own to deal
with the problems.
For example, local rules across the country impose various limits on
the discovery process. Fifty-seven districts have local rules that limit
the number of interrogatories; fifteen districts have rules that impose
discovery cut-off dates; fifteen districts limit the number of requests for
admissions; one district limits the number of depositions; and one
district limits the number of requests for production of documents."
In California, each of the four federal district courts have adopted local
rules that provide that discovery requests and responses generally are
not to be filed with the court. 1
Of course, as discussed below, the disparity in discovery rules has
grown substantially as a result of the revision in Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that allows individual districts to opt-out of the
reforms. The new version of Rule 26 came into effect on December 1,
1993. Rule 26(a) requires that certain categories of information be
disclosed without awaiting a demand for discovery. Rule 26(f) requires
that the parties meet and prepare a discovery plan. Rule 26(d) generally
prohibits discovery until after the discovery conference has been held.
As of April 1994, only one-third of the districts have adopted the
discovery provisions of Rule 26(a),' and about half of the districts have
formally opted-out of the disclosure rules.'
The result is that discovery rules are increasingly determined at the
local, district level, rather than at the national level. The result is
enormous disparity in practice among the districts.
Another area where local rules frequently differ is in the way they
encourage settlement and the use of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR) mechanisms. One of the major changes in civil procedure in the
past decade has been the rise in attention to ADR. Although the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do relatively little to encourage the use of ADR,
an increasing array of local rules on the topic have been adopted.
For example, the District of Columbia's local rules provide for

19. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 26. See discussion accompanying supra notes 103-16.
20. J. Stratton Shartel, Case Tracking, DisclosureProvisionsLead the Way in District
Reform Plans, 7 INSIDE LITIGATION 1, 20 (1993).

21. Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and ProceduralRules: Comment on
Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 647, 657-58 n.43 (1994).
22. John Flynn Rooney, Discovery Rule Lacks Uniformity, Is Source of Confusion:
Critics, CHI.D. BULL., April 23, 1994, at 17.

23. Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Half of Districts Opt Out of New Civil Rules,
NAT'L L.J., February 28, 1994, at 5.
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mediation with the consent of the parties.2" In the Western District of
Washington and the Eastern District of Michigan, cases are assigned to
panels of three attorneys who give written notification of their evaluation of the case within one week.' The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled that a provision in the local rule
providing that attorneys accept mediation by their silence in not
In the Northern District of California,
objecting is permissible.'
certain civil cases are assigned to an individual attorney for evaluation.2
Other districts have adopted a variety of other rules concerning
ADR. s The Northern District of Ohio provides for summary jury trials
where cases are presented to juries, in shortened form, for their
nonbinding decisions.' In the Northern District of Oklahoma, a judge
other than the one assigned to hear the case presides over settlement
conferences."0
Countless other topics besides discovery and the use of ADR are
covered in the various local rules. Local rules sometimes address the
size of the jury,"' the manner of service of process,' and the procedures for summary judgment." The overall result is that substantial
areas of procedure are covered by local rules, and these rules differ
enormously across the country,
2. The Civil Justice Reform Act. The Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990("CJRA")5 ' was Congress' response to frequent calls for court
reform in the late 1980s. According to Senator Biden, the primary
proponent of the CJRA, the Act "was intended to reverse a recent trend
in which one's bank balance, rather than the merits of the case,
controlled a decision to file suit." Senator Biden's concern was that
the cost of federal litigation had escalated, limiting access to the courts

24. Shelby F. Grubbs, A BriefSurvey of CourtAnnexed ADR: Where We Are and Where
We Are Going, 30 TENN. B.J. 20, 27 (1994).

25. Id.
26. Lenaghan v. Pepsico, Inc., 961 F.2d 1250, 1253 (6th Cir. 1992).
27. Id.
28. See Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566,573-74 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (discussing
use of local rules concerning ADR to aid in formulating national procedures)
29. Grubbs, supra note 24, at 27.
30. Id,
31.
person
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (allowing local rule authorizing six
jury in civil cases).
See Kroll Assocs. v. City & County of Honolulu, 21 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1994).
See Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993).
28 U.S.c.A. §§ 471-82 (Supp. 1991).
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Introduction,67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. i (1993).
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by many segments of society. Moreover, there were concerns about the
length of time it took to litigate a case in federal court. According to the
Congress, these problems of cost and delay, coupled with limitations on
judicial resources, were threatening the "just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of civil disputes in our Nation's Federal courts.'
In enacting the CJRA, Congress sought to put its stamp upon the
procedural process of civil litigation. Congress' broad goal in adopting
the CJRA was to implement a set of changes designed to make the
litigation process more efficient. The legislation as originally introduced
required that each district put in place a plan to reduce cost and delay
that incorporated many specific legislatively defined procedures." For
example, the legislation required differentiated case management, a
discovery-case management conference in each case within forty-five
days following a responsive pleading, early setting of trial dates, trackspecific discovery procedures, and a provision for alternative dispute
resolution.' In short, the CJRA represented an attempt by Congress
to describe appropriate civil process. The legislation, as initially
proposed, plainly reflected an impatience with "tinkering changes"
adopted by the Judicial Conference. "By providing the necessary
statutory components, Congress set the agenda for the federal courts to
implement meaningful and effective reform.'
There was nothing inherent in the CJRAs model for how federal
litigation should proceed that required localism in rulemaking. While
one might agree or disagree with the notion that Congress (rather than
the courts themselves) should adopt civil process reform, uniformity
often is the goal of congressional legislation. Likewise, while there has
been and will continue to be deep controversy over the nature of the
reforms Congress proposed, these reforms assuredly could be implemented uniformly throughout the federal district courts. Nonetheless, there
were two fatal flaws in the CJRA that ultimately accounted for the
fragmentation of process that resulted.
First, from the start there was a certain schizophrenia to the CJRA,
for while the bill as originally introduced mandated that district court
plans contain certain uniform ingredients, the legislation nonetheless
required that each district draft its own plan.' In other words, district

36. S. REP. No. 101416, 10th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1-2.
37. See S.2027 (introduced Jan. 25, 1990) at 12.
38. Id. at 14-22.
39. Biden, supra note 35, at ii.
40. See § 2027 at 12 ("each United States district court shall develop a civil justice
expense and delay reduction plan in accordance with this dispute"). Id. at 13 ("Each...
plan shall include the following...").
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courts were charged to do the same thing, but on a district-by-district
basis. The genesis for this schizophrenia apparently was the Brookings
Institute's study, Justice for All: Reducing Costs and Delays in Civil
Litigation.4' Brookings conducted this study at the behest of Senator
Biden and as a precursor for civil justice reform legislation.' Indeed,
the CJRA proposals
essentially reflect the recommendations of the
3
Brookings study.
At the same time as the Brookings study was recommending, and the
original CJRA legislation was mandating very specific reforms, they
were nonetheless insisting that the reforms come from the "bottom up."
The Brookings report's "recommendations take account of the diversity
of caseloads and types of litigations across different federal jurisdictions." In light of these, the members of the Brookings Task Force
stated they (despite many sections that seem flatly to the contrary) "do
not advocate the adoption of a uniform set of reform suggestions to be
applied by all district courts throughout the nation.' "Instead, reform
must come from the 'bottom up,' or from those in each district who must
live with the civil justice system on a regular basis.""
In order to achieve "bottom up" reform, the Brookings Task Force
recommended, and Congress ultimately adopted, the idea of creating an
advisory group in each district to work with the district court in
fashioning a plan to reduce litigation cost and delay. The advisory
groups were to be "balanced," that is, to be composed of a wide variety
of representatives of all segments of the community that litigated before
the court, including the plaintiffs' and defense bars, public interest
attorneys and government attorneys, corporate representatives and other
members of the lay public.' 7 These groups, composed in large part of
individuals with no prior rulemaking or social science background,'
were to assess the state of the district court docket, identify the causes
of cost and delay, and develop a plan to address those causes. The plans

41. Brookings Institution Task Force, Justice for All: Reducing Costs and Delays in
Civil Litigation (Brookings Inst., 1989) [hereinafter "Brookings Study".
42. Brookings Study, supra note 41, at vii.
43. Jeffrey J. Peck, 'Users United': The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW &
CoNTzM. PRoBs. 105, 108 (1991).
44. Brookings Study, supra note 41, at 11.
45. Id.
46. Id
47. Id. at 12.
48. This has been a complaint of commentators. See, eg., Linda Mullenix, The CounterReformation in ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 400-03 (1992); Lauren K. Robel,
GrassRoots Procedure:Local Advisory Groups and the Civil JusticeReform Act of 1990, 59
BROOK. L. REv. 879, 905 (1993).
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would then be forwarded to the district court for eventual adoption or
modification.
The Brookings Report, and the subsequent legislative process, are
remarkably vague about the sense of, or rationale for, this process of
"bottom up" rulemaking. What explanation there is consists largely of
platitudes. In toto, the Brookings explanation for this unprecedented
process is the Task Force's belief
that the wide participation of those who use and are involved in the
court system in each district will not only maximize the prospects that
workable plans will be developed, but will also stimulate a muchneeded dialogue between the bench, the bar, and client communities
about methods of streamlining litigation practice. 0
Nor did the Brookings explanation for "bottom up" reform receive much
development in the legislative process that followed. The statement
itself was repeated or paraphrased repeatedly in the speeches, testimony, and reports that accompanied the CJRA. Witnesses seemed to
make two primary points. First, at the local level there was a store of
knowledge that could be drawn upon to accomplish reform. Second,
reform was more likely to succeed if it was designed by those whom it
would affect.
What is intriguing about the Brookings report and the original
legislation is the illusion of local control. While purporting to create a
process of local option, virtually everything else about the original
recommendations was mandatory. Scanning the list of Brookings
recommendations makes the point succinctly:
PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATIONS 51
1. By statute, direct all federal districtcourts to develop and implement within twelve months a "CivilJustice Reform Plan."
2. Include in each district court's plan a system of case tracking or
differentiated case management.
3. Require in each district'strackingsystem the setting of early,firm

trial dates at the outset of all noncomplex cases.
4. Set time guidelines for the completion of discovery in each
district'stracking system.

49. Brookings Study, supra note 41, at 12.
50. As Linda Mullenix has observed, "The same corporate, business, and insurance
interests who underwrite the various Harris surveys and who participated in the
Brookings-Biden task force subsequently appeared to testify in support of the wholesale
revamping of federal civil procedure." Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The
PervasiveMyth of Pervasive Discovery and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1419 (1994).
51. These are pulled verbatim from throughout the Brookings Report.
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5. Permit in each district'splan only narrowly drawn "goodcause"
exceptions for delaying trials and discovery deadlines.
6. Include procedures for resolving motions necessary to meet the
trial dates and the discovery deadlines in each district'splan.
7. Provide in each district court's plan for neutral evaluation
proceduresand mandatoryscheduling or case management conferences
at the outset of all but the simplest of cases.
8. Require in each district'splan that authorized representativesof
the parties with decisionmaking authority be present or available by
telephone duringany settlement conference.
9. Shorten current service provisions from 120 to 60 days.
10. Provide in each district's plan for the regular publication of
pending undecided motions and caseloadprogress.
11. Ensure in each district'splan that magistratesdo not perform
tasks best performed by thejudiciary. Include mechanismsfor reducing
backlogs in the plans of district courts with significant backlogs.

The resulting legislation differed little in tone from the Brookings
recommendation. Each district was told it "shall implement" its plan,
and each plan "shall include," certain elements. 2 What followed in the
legislation was an extremely detailed structure for civil case management allowing for little deviation except perhaps in the exact specification of the litigation tracks and the time deadlines for litigation on those
tracks.
It is here, moreover, that the second flaw presented itself, a flaw
perhaps as much of process as of substance. Senator Biden, it appears,
decided to pursue judicial reform without consulting the judges.' The
result was what one might have expected. "Early exchanges between
representatives of the judiciary and sponsors of the legislation can only
be described as acrimonious.'
Individual judges, and the Judicial
Conference as a whole, rose up to oppose the legislation.5
The ultimate result of judicial opposition, however, may well have
done as much harm as good. The Judicial Conference, recognizing that
the drumbeat of reform was going to overtake it unless it did something,
promptly convened a committee of judges to study the problem and

52. See supra note 40. See S.2027.
53. See Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on
S.2027, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 220-21 (Mar. 6, 1990); see also id. at 221 (statement of Hon. Aubrey
E. Robinson, Jr., describing negative reaction of judges to S.2027) [hereinafter Senate
Hearings).
54. A.Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of the Civil
JusticeReform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 877, 882 (1993).

55. See supra note 53 (discussing negative reaction of federal bench).
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present its own solution.' The plan finally approved by the Conference
had very little substance in terms of specific steps that could or should
be taken to address cost and delay. But, surprisingly, the plan did have
as its cornerstone creation of individual advisory groups in each district
that would help assess the docket and suggest "different measures that
might be implemented to reduce cost and delay and improve case
management practices.
District courts were instructed to "carefully
consider" the advisory group reports, and to "implement the recommendations that the court concludes would be feasible and constructive
"55

The end result of this sometimes bitter dialogue between Congress and
the judiciary was legislation whose only result could be tremendous
balkanization of the civil rules. The idea of advisory groups and "bottom
up" reform stayed in." The mandatory nature of the reforms, however,
was thrown out.' The advisory groups, largely composed of people
with little or no rulemaking experience, were required to be active in
each district; suggestions were made as to what they should do, but the
CJRA seems to require little beyond consideration by the advisory
groups. Thus, the groups were set off on their own, with little requirement of uniform results. Review of the actual provisions of the Act
indicate numerous aspects designed to inhibit rather than further a
coherent framework of civil practice.
First, and perhaps most important, the CJRA may well permit
deviation not only among districts, but also from the broad framework
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and from other provisions of the
United States Code as well. There is a sharp dispute about whether
Congress intended such deviation. The General Counsel of the
Administrative Office has taken the view that such deviance is
permitted only in very limited circumstances."' But Professor Tobias
concludes that Congress implicitly, and perhaps expressly, empowered
advisory groups to suggest, and districts to adopt, procedures that

56. See Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 217-18 (Statement of Hon. Aubrey E.
Robinson, Jr.) (detailing Judicial Conference efforts to develop a response to S.2027).
57. See Judicial Conference Approves Plan to Improve Civil Case Management, 22 THE
THIRD BRANCH No. 5, May 1990, at 1.
58. Id. at 2.
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 478 (advisory groups).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 473 (advisory group "shall consider and may include" CJRA principles)
(emphasis supplied).
61. Levin, supra note 54, at 890; see also Lauren Robel, FracturedProcedure: The Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (1994) (CJRA not intended to
permit deviation from Federal Rules).
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contravene provisions in the Federal Rules and the United States
Code." Tobias quotes the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas as stating, "'[To the extent that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are inconsistent with this Plan, the Plan has precedence
and is controlling."' The issue awaits resolution in the courts and in
the circuit and judicial conference committees that have review authority
over the CJRA plans."
Whatever the correct legal conclusion, the reality is that district court
plans are deviating from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' Even
the General Counsel of the Administrative Office appeared to accept
deviation on discovery matters, concluding that the CJRA "expands the
civil rules" in limited areas such as discovery."
Professor Tobias
targets other explicit deviation. The Eastern District of Texas adopted
an offer of judgment provision inconsistent with Rule 68.7 The
Montana District is assigning cases equally to Article HI and magistrate
judges, with a time-limited opt-out provision, in conflict with 28 U.S.C.
Section 636(c)(2) (and perhaps with the Constitution)."
In fact, as Tbbias points out, many districts are adopting rules that
not only are inconsistent with the framework of federal practice, but
seem not even expressly permitted by the CJRA itself.' Examples are
deeply troubling. The Eastern District of Texas imposed a limit on
contingency fees.7" The Western District of Missouri adopted its own
mandatory, non-binding ADR program.7 The Montana District set up
72
a peer review committee to review litigation conduct of lawyers.
While the CJRA does permit adoption of "other features," at least some
of the innovations conflict with statutory or constitutional principles.7 s
Second, the very nature of the advisory groups is likely to lead to illadvised and balkanized reform. The chief judge was ordered to appoint
the group within ninety days, and required that each group "shall be

62. Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49, 54-55.
63. Id. at 51 (quoting Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan, at 9 (Dec. 20,
1991)).
64. TAN regarding this review authority.
65. On such conflicts see Robel, supra note 61, at 1452-53.
66. Levin, supra note 54, at 890.
67. Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the BalkanizationofFederalCivil Procedure,
24 Am. ST. L.J. 1393, 1417 (1992).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1416-17.
70. Id. at 1420.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1421.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 473(bX6) (Supp. II 1990).
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balanced and include attorneys and other persons who are representatives of major categories of litigants in such court ... .

'

There was

no requirement of, or provision for, expertise in either rulemaking or
social science skills each group would desperately need. Moreover, with
the exception of the United States Attorney, no member was permitted
to serve for more than four years, eliminating any hope of continuity.
Third, the heart of the groups' task was entirely discretionary. The
advisory groups were required to recommend measures to eliminate cost
and delay, but nothing specific was required in those plans. Rather, the
legislation set out six principles that the plans "may include."75 To
make matters worse, the legislation as adopted specifically required that
the advisory groups "shall take into account the particular needs and
circumstances of the district court, litigants in such court, and the
litigants' attorneys."'

This, quite obviously, is an invitation to

disuniformity.
Finally, the Act creates an illusion of careful study and experimentation that is just that-an illusion. To read the Act one gets an idea that
the CJRA is a carefully controlled study that commences with local
projects and ends with comprehensive reporting on the projects that
have worked, along with national direction from the Judicial Conference
on the effectiveness of management techniques. The advisory groups
and district courts are charged to initially and on a continuing basis
assess the state of the docket.77 The Judicial Conference is to review
plans created by early implementation districts and may develop a model
plan or plans.7
Finally, section 479 of the CJRA mandated an
elaborate process of information collection and reporting about the cost
and delay plans. 9
The difficulty with all this is that true experimentation-which can be
very valuable-requires accurate data collection and reporting, control
groups, and a basis for assessing success and failure. The CJRA
provides for none of this.' Advisory groups necessarily engaged in
extremely unscientific studies of cost and delay, as well as the state of
the docket. There were no national questionnaires or studies. Much of
the "evidence" collected was anecdotal. As we discuss below, plans
varied widely. For most of the districts there were no control groups.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

28 U.S.C. § 5473(bX6) (Supp. 1992).
Id. § 473.
Id. § 472(c)(2).
Id. § 472(c).
See Civil Justice Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title I, § 103(c).
28 U.S.C. § 479(c).

80. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text regarding experimentation.
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As the saying goes, "garbage in, garbage out." The Judicial Conference's
conclusions cannot hope to have any real value, because the "data" are
so unreliable. Experiments can yield important information, but not if
they are designed improperly.
Although the final results will be some time in coming, every early
indication is that the very fragmentation in process one might have
expected is occurring. The CJRA required a series of reports on the
various plans from the district courts. 8' The final report on the
contents of the various plans (but not yet, obviously, on their ostensible
success or failure) is not due out until December 1994. But many of the
plans are available. Moreover, the Judicial Conference prepared a Model
Plan, as well as documentation about the plans in early implementation
and pilot districts.
The "Model Plan' is perhaps a good place to start, for it is not a
model plan at all. Rather, the Introduction tells us, "no single method
of case management is suitable for all courts."' For this reason, the
Model Plan appears in the form of a "menu," which allows the courts to
select the provisions most responsive to each court's needs." What
follows is perhaps best described as a smorgasbord, including numerous
provisions relating to every aspect of the Act, as well as "a number of
unique initiatives undertaken by individual courts to address special
problem areas.'
Given the wide variety of choices, even if districts
looked only to the Model Plan, there likely would be tremendous
diversity.
Opportunities for variance are rife in the Model Plan. For almost any
aspect of case management there are two to four "alternatives." With
regard to ADR programs alone, there are seven categories of possible
ADR programs, each with several possible alternatives.' Under the
"Ohio Northern" alternative, Early Neutral Evaluation ("ENE") is upon
motion of the court or parties. The rules governing evaluation under
that alternative run almost six pages in length."' Under the "Idaho"
alternative, ENE is upon consent of all parties.'M Under the "California
Southern" alternative, ENE is mandatory." Under the "Pennsylvania

81. 28 U.S.C. § 472.

82. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MODEL CIvIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

REDUCTION PLAN (Oct. 1992).
Id. (introduction).
I&
Id.
Id. at 52-82.
Id. at 52-57.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
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Eastern" alternative, arbitration is compulsory in many civil cases in
which over $100,000 is in controversy." Under the "Idaho" alternative,
arbitration is available upon consent of the parties.9 1
Of course, the existence of these district-named alternatives reveals
that the Model Plan is not a model at all, but simply an indication of the
balkanization that has occurred in the Early Implementation Districts
("EIDS") under the CJRA. The Judicial Conference apparently has
subscribed wholeheartedly to the idea of "bottom up" reform, adopting
diversity as its plan for civil procedure. Although the Model Plan
provides some commentary, by and large it leaves districts free to do
anything they like, providing little guidance as to what might be
preferable.
Early reports on the CJRA suggest tremendous fragmentation is
occurring. The final reports on the CJRA are not yet out, but Congress
required the Judicial Conference to report on the EIDs by June 1, 1992.
That report comprehensively describes the CJRA plans of thirty-four
EIDs, roughly one-third of all the federal districts." The report
demonstrates tremendous diversity in approaches to data-gathering and
rulemaking, not to speak of procedures themselves. Anyone wanting a
comprehensive view of the fragmentation of civil procedure will need to
read the entire report, with its numerous multi-cell charts collecting and
trying to organize all the different approaches. But for a taste of the
situation, this part of the report, dealing with Differential Case
Management ("DCM"), may make the point succinctly:
Track Numbers. Two of the twenty-six courts that adopted DCM
decided not to use formalized "tracks" for case management. The
remainder established tracks numbering from two to six. Three and
six track systems were the most favored, representing eight and seven
of the subject courts, respectively. Four courts chose two tracks, three
courts chose four tracks, and two courts chose five.9
The Report on EIDs demonstrated not just inter-district divergence,
but intra-district divergence as well. For example, the Western District
of Missouri has an "early assessment program" for civil cases." The
program "is designed to encourage parties to assess their case at an

90. Id. at 67.
91. Id. at 65.
92. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT.

DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS By EARLY IMPLEMENTATION DlSTmcTS AND
PILOT COURTS (June 1, 1992).
93. Id. at 11.
94. Id. at 27.
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But not all cases are in the program. Of the eligible
early stage.
cases, one in three is randomly assigned to the program; one in three is
not permitted to use the program; and in one of three cases the parties
may opt-in." For cases in the program, the parties must choose one of
four ADR options (arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, or
magistrate judge settlement conference)." If the parties cannot choose,
the choice is made for them."
It would be difficult to summarize the fragmentation the CJRA is
yielding. Perhaps, when all is said and done, a picture is worth a
thousand words. What follows, then, is the chart used to summarize the
state of affairs in the Middle District of Tennessee following "adoption"
by the district court of the advisory group's plan. 9 Adoption is set out
in quotations, for reasons that the chart makes amply clear. The
vertical axis of the chart reflects key aspects of the district plan. The
horizontal axis lists the judges in the district (the latter two columns are
magistrate judges, who under the adopted plan have primary responsibility for case management). The chart informs users of the system of
the rules that will govern their cases. It, of course, is not published in
any fashion available nationally. Need we say more?

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id,
99. For what it is worth, one of us, Barry Friedman, was a member of the Middle
District of Tennessee's Advisory Committee. Despite some initial skepticism about the
endeavor, Friedman was pleased with the group's recommendations, although-as the
chart indicates-it is uncertain what exactly has become of them.
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Chart from June 23, 1994, CJRA Assessment Meeting
DIFFERENCES IN CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
Nixon

Wiseman

Higgins

Echols

I. Who is Case Manager?

MJ

MJ

DJ

MJ-l/2

2. Time within which
ICMC scheduled after
case filed

45 days

45 days

45 days

MJ-45
DJ-90

3. Discovery Stay preICMC

Yes

Yes

Yes-unless
ordered in
specific
case

MJ-Yes
DJ-No

4. Description of Order
entered after ICMC

N/A

N/A

"Order"

"Discovery
Plan"

5. Trial Scheduled at
ICMC or in initial
order

No

No

Yes

No

None
yet

No

Yes-but not
in all cases

None yet

7. Requires compliance
with FRCP 26(a)(1)

No

No

No

8. Has indicated that as a
general rule, will
require compliance
with Local Rule
12(c)(6)(c)

No

No

9. Stages Discovery

N/A

N/A

Morton

Sandidge

Haynes

45 days

45 days

Yes

Yes

'M
Order"

"CM
Order"

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No-except
for discovery on
qualified
immunity

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

DJ-l/2

6. Refers Dispositive
Motions in CCM cases
to Mis

10. As a general rule,
enforces stay of discovery while dispositive
motions pending
LEGEND: CCM
DI
ICMC
CM
Mi

Customized Case Management
District Judge
Initial Case Management Conference
Case Management
Magistrate Judge

No
N/A

1995]

FEDERAL RULES

775

The 1993 Civil Rules Amendments
The judiciary-or at least the Judicial Conference and the Federal
Rules Committees-weighed in on the question of reform with the 1993
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The most
controversial of these amendments were the amendments to Rule 26,
which require mandatory disclosure by the parties of certain information
at the outset of litigation and without a discovery request. Three
Supreme Court Justices dissented on the merits from the order
transmitting the rules to Congress.'o A vigorous effort was made to
kill these amendments in Congress,0 1 an effort that ultimately failed
more for scheduling reasons that anything else.
The 1993 amendments exacerbate the problem with fragmentation of
the federal rules. The amendments generally are rife with provisions
permitting district courts to opt-out from the federal rule by local rule
or order of the court. Opt-out provisions extend to a variety of rules both
minor and significant, ranging from the "meet and confer" requirement
of Rule 26(f) to modification of the newly presumptive number of
interrogatories or depositions permitted under the rules.1's
We are unaware, prior to the adoption of the Rule 26 amendments, of
any other such provisions permitting districts to opt-out of federal rules.
There have been rules-Rule 16 comes notably to mind-that left certain
procedures to the discretion of the district court.' 3 Moreover, for
better or for worse, local districts might adopt their own general rules
regarding such discretionary features. But no rule we can
4 pinpoint
rule.'0
the
ignoring
of
option
the
courts
district
gave
simply
The history of the new mandatory disclosure rule, Rule 26(a),
highlights more than any other deep problems with the rulemaking
process and the resultant balkanization of the federal rules. When the
mandatory disclosure rule was proposed in August of 1991, it ran into
a gale of criticism from the bench and bar. In addition to attacking the
rule on the merits, critics argued that widespread change of this nature

B.

100. See 113 S. Ct. 581 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Thomas and Souter)
(dissenting from transmission of rules); Id. at 575 (statement of Justice White expressing
concern about rulemaking process).
101. See Thumbs Down From House Rule Changes, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
WEEKLY REPORr, Nov. 6, 1993 at 3057.
102. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) ("Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or
directed by order or local rule, .. "); accord FED. R. CIrV. P. 26(a)(4); 26(b); 26(d).
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
104. See Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local Abrogation: In Search of
a Theory of Optional Rules, 14 REV. LrriG. 49, 50, 59 (1994) (discussing unprecedented
nature of Rule 26 and questioning sense of rule deviation).
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was inappropriate given the experimentation encouraged under the
CJRA. In their CJRA plans, several districts had previously adopted
some form of mandatory disclosure requirement. Responding to these
criticisms, the Advisory Committee initially withdrew the proposal, only
to reinsert it at the last moment albeit with some substantive changes.
The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that the Committee felt that to
wait for the results of the CJRA experimentation period would delay the
reforms too long-another five years.' 5
In a nod to the CJRA, however, the Advisory Committee did decide to
permit courts by local rule or order of the court to opt out of the
mandatory disclosure provisions in whole or in part.' In essence, the
result is a national standard from which courts may opt-out, rather than
the CJRs approach of inviting courts to opt-in if they choose. The
mandatory disclosure provision was voted down in the House of
Representatives, and the Committee Report expresses a preference for
the latter approach.' 7 As will be obvious in a moment, this may be a
distinction without a difference from the perspective of uniformity.
The adoption of the mandatory disclosure rules demonstrate numerous
problems with the rulemaking process in general.. Perhaps the most
pervasive is, again, the sad state of what seems to be accepted as
experimentation. The Advisory Committee Notes appear to rely upon
"the experience of district courts that have required disclosure of some
of this information. . .," and the "far more limited, experience of the few
state and federal courts that have required pre-discovery exchange of
core information such as is contemplated .. ." by the new rule.l'o In
his dissent, Justice Scalia chided the Advisory Committee for not
awaiting more detailed study.'co So too did the Committee Report
from the House of Representatives."' But in the latter case, at least,
the further study was to be provided by the process of CJRA experimentation, a process that we already have seen is somewhat less than
scientific. One may comfortably add to this problem with "junkscience"
a certain hubris on the part of those involved in the rulemaking process,
who displayed an odd eagerness to achieve reform at any cost, and over
vast opposition.

105. FD. R. Civ. P. 26(1X1) advisory committee's notes (1993 Amendments). See Linda

S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The PervasiveMyth of Pervasive DiscoveryAbuse and
the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1445 (1994)
(reviewing failure to conduct study before changing discovery rule).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(1X1), advisory committee notes (1993 Amendments).
107. See H. R. REP. No. 103-319, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1993).
108. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (1993 Amendments).
109. 113 S. Ct. at 5-6.
110. H.R. REP. No. 103-319 at 5.
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The result of the rulemaking process is nothing that can seriously be
called a rule at all. On March 1, 1994 the Federal Judicial Center
released a compilation of federal district court practice regarding the
mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 26.1" The results of the
compilation defy easy summary because so many district courts are
doing so many different things. The compilation itself includes a fivepage table showing the practices of the district courts, with this attempt
at tallying:
Nature of the Court's Response
Courts whose decisions are final and
where FRCP 26(a) is in effect
Courts whose decisions are final and
where FRCP 26(a) is not in effect
(aXI) only is not in effect
Courts whose decisions are final and
where FRCP 26(a) is not in effect but
that have other provisions for disclosure
The individual judge is explicitly
given authority to require disclosure
Local rules or the CJRA plan require
disclosure
Courts whose decisions are provisional
FRCP 26(a) provisionally is not in effect
(a)(1) only is provisionally not in effect
Local requirements are in place
(a)(1)-(3) are provisionally not in effect
Local requirements are in place
FRCP 26(a) provisionally is in effect

Number of Courts
32
6
4
21
13
8
30
25
12
6
13
2

5U2

The report states that "few of the fifteen largest districts, as measured
by number of judgeships, are fully implementing Rule 26(a).""3
Of course, counting the practices of districts themselves minimizes the
extent of diversity. In many of the districts, the decision whether to
engage in mandatory discovery is left to individual judges, and judges
are likely to have practices strung out on a continuum. Moreover,
districts (and individual judges) may, and do, pick and choose among the
various new provisions of Rule 26.
The result is a hodgepodge, one for which it is difficult to see the
benefits. The diversity of practice is troubling, because discovery most
assuredly is a practice that affects substantive rights and litigation

111. See 1994 U.S.S.C.&.N. No.3, 103rd Cong., 2d Sees., at 130.
112. Id. at 6135-36.
113. Id. at 6136.
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outcomes. Undoubtedly, if the relevant information is available, there
will be forum and judge shopping based upon the diverse application of
the rules. Moreover, there is no serious argument that experimentation
justifies this crazy-quilt, for the nature of the exercise promises highly
conflicting and unscientific results.
C.

Why the Trend to Localism?
No single factor accounts for the increased reliance on local decisions
concerning procedural rules. Above all, concern with managing the
enormous caseloads of the district courts has led to calls for procedural
reform and the enactment of local rules throughout the country. In
1975, for example, 117,320 new civil cases were filed in federal
courts, 1' and 230,509 new civil cases were filed in 1992."'
The growth in the caseload can be dealt with in only three possible
ways. One would be to increase the number of judges. Although there
has been some increase in the size of the federal bench, the result still
has been a substantial increase in the number of civil cases filed per
judge.116 In 1975, approximately 293 cases were commenced per
judge;11 7 now it is about 355 cases per judge." There is no indication that Congress is prepared to create enough new judges to deal with
the increased volume of cases in federal courts." 9
A second way to deal with the growing caseload is for Congress to
curtail some aspects of federal jurisdiction. For example, a few years
ago Congress increased the jurisdictional amount in diversity cases from
in excess of $10,000 to in excess of $50,000."2' The Federal Court
Study Commission proposed other ways of decreasing the caseload in
Again,
federal courts, including abolishing diversity jurisdiction.'

114. 1977 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, table 11, at 189 (1977).
115.

1992 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United

States Courts, table c, at Al-48 (1993).
116. See William W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalizationof the
Administrationof Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REV. 651, 699 (1994).
117. 1977 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, table 15, at 205 (1977).
118.

1992 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United

States Courts, table 5, at 7 (1993).
119. Increasing the number of federal judges is controversial, with some claiming
substantial disadvantages to a great increase in the size of the federal judiciary. For a

review of these arguments see Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of
the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1990).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988 amendment).
121. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURT
STUDY COMMITTEE 14 (1990).
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although there have been some efforts in this regard, major reductions
in the scope of federal jurisdiction are unlikely.
That leaves the final alternative: managerial reforms. Procedural
rules are changed to try to make courts more efficient and better able to
handle the crush of their caseloads. For example, the local rules
discussed above that encourage settlements and require, or at least
promote, the use of ADR are efforts to free up judicial resources. The
Civil Justice Reform Act required each district to devise plans for better
case management and thus fostered this trend towards localism.' 2
Local rules are much easier to change and to adopt than are revisions
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, as districts perceived a
need for additional reforms to make procedures more efficient they
changed their local rules and adopted new rules to cover matters that
previously had been unregulated.
At the same time, the lack of consensus as to how to deal with the rise
in the federal courts', caseload also is responsible for the greater
divergence among districts. Allowing individual districts to opt-out of
the new version of Rule 26 was a political compromise in response to
strong opposition to the disclosure provisions. Likewise, permitting
individual districts to implement various discovery rules reflects a lack
of national agreement and a compromise to allow the matter to be
handled locally. There is a widespread sense of discovery abuse, but no
agreement as to how to solve the problem. The result, especially after
allowing districts to opt-out of new Rule 26, is enormous divergence in
discovery procedures across the country.
Allowing matters to be resolved at the local level also has a political
benefit for decisionmakers: they can duck deciding a hard question by
leaving it to local rules to handle. Especially in highly controversial
areas where any particular solution is likely to produce intense
disagreement, local rules allow the Judicial Conference to propose
solutions, but not encounter political heat because the actual choices are
made at the local level.
A sense of federalism, or more precisely, localism, also explains the
increasing lack of uniformity. Although all federal courts are part of the
same federal judicial system, there is a view that solutions are often best
arrived at locally. In part, this is based on a sense that local participation will produce more satisfaction with the rules and therefore make
them easier to implement. In part, too, there is a view that problems
and needs vary across the country and that local rules can best be
tailored to local concerns.

122. 28 U.S.C. § 471.
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Finally, the trend towards local rules is exacerbated by the relatively
minimal oversight by federal courts of appeals. The courts of appeals,
and the Judicial Conference, have the authority to overrule the local
rules. Yet, this is very rarely done. Court of appeals judges seem to
defer to district court judges as to matters of procedure in the district
courts. The courts of appeals seem much more willing to accept
disuniformity among districts than to invalidate local rules.
All of these pressures push in one direction: ever more matters
covered in local rules and ever more divergence among districts in their
rules of procedure. Below we argue this trend should be reversed.
III. THE CASE FOR UNIFORMITY

A primary justification for adopting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was to increase the uniformity in procedural rules in federal
courts across the country. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a federal district court was supposed to follow the
procedural rules for state courts in that state.'
Rules thus varied
enormously among federal courts as state law determined the federal
courts' procedural rules. In response to an enormous disparity among
federal courts in procedures, the Federal Rules were adopted with "the
very purpose .. of providing for a single uniform system of procedure."124
But more than a half century after the adoption of the Federal Rules,
is uniformity still a value worth seeking? Are there greater benefits in
allowing diversity, in the procedural rules among the federal districts?
In addressing these questions, initially we consider the benefits of
uniformity that are compromised or lost with the trend to localism that
is described above. Then, we respond to the claimed benefits of
localism-such as local customs, differences in dockets, and experimentation-and argue that these are largely illusory and do not justify the
current trend away from uniformity.
A.

The Benefits of Uniform FederalRules
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Conformity Act of 18721" required that federal courts conform to the
procedural rules of the state courts.'" Specifically, the Conformity Act

123. Charles E. Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Civil Procedure, 20 CORNELL
L.Q. 443, 451 (1935).
124. Id. at 448.
125. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 stat. 197.
126. Id.
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required that

the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil
causes, other than equity or admiralty cases, shall conform, as near as
may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of procedure
existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record in the State
within which such district courts are held.2
The result, by definition, was an enormous divergence of procedure in
federal courts. There was "great disuniformity in practice among the
federal courts, which varied widely from the archaic to the relatively
modern, depending on the varying practice among the states.""
There is thus no doubt that the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was motivated, in part, by the desire for uniform procedures
in the federal courts. 1'2 The justifications for uniformity in the 1930s
are still powerful today.3 0 Indeed, today few question the value of
uniformity. If asked whether the Federal Rules should be abolished and
replaced entirely by local rules, it is safe to say that virtually no judge
or attorney would make that choice. The trend towards localism is
paradoxical because it coexists with a strong consensus that uniform
procedural rules are desirable.
There are many commonly accepted values to uniformity. First,
uniform federal rules are more fair to litigants. When rules vary among
districts, the costs of litigating can vary enormously. For example,
districts with strict limits on discovery might be much less expensive to
litigate in than districts without limits on discovery. The outcome of
cases can depend not on the merits, but on the district and its procedural rules. The result of a case might be different in a district which
pressures settlement and the use of ADR compared with one that does
not. It seems unfair that the result in federal courts might turn on
geography.
The response to this, however, is that such disparity is an inherent
part of a large nation and that diversity can be a good thing. For
example, criminal laws and penalties vary greatly among the states.
Why then should procedures not vary among federal districts to reflect
differing needs and views?
The difference is that federalism accords to each state great latitude

127. Id.
128.

JAMES FLEMING, r AL., CML PROCEDURE 20 (4th ed. 1992).

129. See William D. Mitchell, Uniform State and Federal Practice:A Demand for More
Efficient JudicialProcedure,24 A.B.A. J. 981 (1938).
130. In addition to the values discussed here, see Janice Toran, Tis a Gift to Be Simple:
Aesthetics and ProceduralReform, 89 MICH. L. REv. 352 (1990) (discussing the aesthetics
of procedural simplicity).
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in devising its own laws so long as they are not inconsistent with the
Constitution and federal laws. A consequence of this is that there will
be disparity among the states in both the law's substance and procedure.
But the federal courts are supposed to be a single system. Within that
system it is unfair for the outcome to depend on the accident of location.
Second, uniformity is desirable to avoid forum shopping. The more
local rules cover important matters and the more that such rules vary,
the greater the amount of likely forum shopping. For instance, if one
district has a requirement for mandatory ADR and another does not,
lawyers are likely, at times, to choose where to file based on their desire
to have or to avoid such mechanisms. Similarly, a lawyer's desire to
have or to avoid the mandatory disclosure provisions of the new
discovery rules will affect, and perhaps determine, where the case is
filed.
The response to this is to question whether forum shopping is
undesirable. The presumption in many areas of procedural law is that
forum shopping is something to be avoided. For example, the landmark
case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,3 1 which held that state law should
be used in diversity cases, was based, in large part, on a desire to
decrease forum shopping."' 2 Yet, what is undesirable about litigants
selecting the forum where they believe that they have the best chance
of succeeding? Certainly, litigants choose whether to file a case in
federal or state court partly based on an assessment of where they have
the greatest chance of prevailing. Likewise, a litigant might choose to
file in one state or another, or in one district or another, based on an
assessment of the judges in each jurisdiction and their likely views on
the issues at stake.
Perhaps the dislike of forum shopping is based on an inchoate sense
that it is wrong to have results turn on the choice of forum. But put in
this way, the opposition to forum shopping seems to assume a degree of
fungibility among judges and a degree of formalism that is unrealistic
and simply wrong.
The opposition to forum shopping might be the sense that it is unfair
that results vary depending on geography within the federal system.
This, of course, means that the forum shopping argument is just another
way of expressing the fairness claim discussed above.
There also is an efficiency-based reason for wanting to discourage
forum shopping. The more the two sides in a lawsuit see the costs or
outcome depending on the district where the case is litigated, the more
there will be fights over venue and jurisdiction. Uniformity in procedur131. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
132. 304 F.2d 603, 74-75 (1938).
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al rules thus eliminates one reason why the parties might have lengthy
and costly fights over the location of the litigation.
This is closely related to a third justification for uniformity: the
benefits of standardization. If rules vary among districts, lawyers must
expend substantial time learning the individual rules for each district.
Inevitably, lawyers will sometimes err in dealing with unfamiliar
procedures, leading to additional court time in admonishing attorneys
and in enforcing compliance. Standardization is more efficient and
decreases the costs of litigation.
Lawyers increasingly practice in a nationwide market for legal
services. Such nationalism is good in that it increases the competition
among lawyers and allows more specialization.
The greater the
divergence among local rules, the harder it is for the out-of-state
attorney to practice in a different jurisdiction. Although such localism
might be a boost to the local bar, it is the type of parochialism that is
ultimately inefficient. In California, a plaintiff in San Diego should not
be encouraged to choose a San Diego attorney over one from Los Angeles
or San Francisco simply because the San Diego attorney knows the local
rules better than the other lawyers.
B.

The Supposed Benefits of Local Rules

Despite what we believe are good arguments against a fragmented
system of local rules, there are those who argue that local rules serve
their purposes. In this section we address the primary arguments in
favor of local rules. Our conclusion is that there are very few instances
in which local rules are necessary or appropriate. Further, we conclude
that there should be a central system for reviewing proposed local rules,
in order to ensure that a local rule is necessary and furthers a purpose
that outweighs the disadvantages of rule fragmentation.
1. Local Custom. One of the arguments advanced most frequently
in favor of local rules is "local custom." The argument seems to have two
related pieces; first, that conditions differ in different districts requiring
different rules, and second, that local actors simply are familar with
doing things a certain way. For example, just two years after the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, a committee of district
judges charged to study local rules concluded that "varying local
conditions made 'absolute uniformity in the local rules of the district
courts... impracticable and inadvisable. ' "'
'
To the extent that the argument rests on local custom, it seems to be

133. Subrin, supra note 1, at 2017 (quoting the Knox Report).
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a thin argument indeed. Stephen Flanders explains that the practice of
law is specfic to a jurisdiction "in a degree unheard of in professions
such as medicine or engineering." s He goes on to say, "Federal
judges, for the most part, are products of the locations they serve."
Diversity is a necessity in federal courts so that they can respond not
only to local expectations and practice but also to specific institutional
demands."1'
Putting the very last piece aside for a moment, this
sounds a good deal more like an explanation of why local rules do exist
than why they should. Undoubtedly it is convenient for locales to have
rules that reflect local practice, particularly to the extent that "local
practice" means "the same as practice in the state courts." This very
argument, however, was rejected when the federal rules were adopted.
One of the primary arguments in favor of the Conformity Act was that
it would be easier for practioners in a locale to have to learn only one set
of rules. The federal rules were adopted despite this plea, however,
largely because it was felt that a system of national courts should run
under uniform rules.
In other words, national uniformity won out over
13 7
local uniformity.
What made sense in 1938 makes even more sense today. While it is
certainly correct that much of the practice of law for many practioners
is local, it also is true that increasingly the practice of law is crossing
not only state but national boundaries. 1 The premise of the federal
courts is that they reflect one court system doing the nation's business.
Permitting a profusion of local rules. for the simple reason that local
practioners are familiar with them inappropriately disadvantages
litigants and their counsel coming from out of state. Absent some better
reason, it is insufficient simply to argue in favor of local rules for no
other reason than that locals like to do things a certain way.
The argument takes on a bit more force when proponents of localism
seek to justify local rules on the ground that local conditions differ,
requiring a different set of procedures. This may be what Flanders is
getting at when he discusses "specific institutional demands," 9 and
it certainly is what the framers of the CJRA had in mind when they

134. Steven Flanders, Local Rules in FederalDistrict Courts: Userpation,Legislation,
jor Information? 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 263 (1981).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 263-64.
137. See generally Subrin, supra note 1, at 1999-2011. See also Herbert M. Kritzer &
Frances Kahn Zemans, 27 LAW & SOC. REV. 535, 549-52 (1993) (questioning existence of
"local legal culture" in federal districts).
138. See Barry Friedman, Federalism'sFuturein the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1441, 1458 (1994) (discussing how GATT will internationalize the practice of law).
139. Flanders, supra note 137, at 263-64.
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advocated "bottom up" reform. Beginning with the Brookings Institute
Study there was recognition that "our recommendations take account of
the diversity of caseloads and types of litigation across different federal
jurisdictions."' Dockets may differ significantly in districts due to a
heavy caseload of criminal cases, or a concentration of products liability
cases such as asbestos or breast implants.
While the argument for local rulemaking based upon diversity has
some superficial appeal, it does not hold up well under close scrutiny.
As we stress above, procedure affects substance; the way the rules work
affects outcomes. It may well be that certain districts are laboring under
numerous criminal cases, and so it is more convenient to change the way
civil cases are handled in order to free up judicial time. Rural districts
may simply have smaller caseloads making it easier to deal with the
docket without substantial reform. But despite these factors, we are
troubled by the answer being to change the procedure in a class of cases
to accomodate others. While this might, within a district, seem an
appropriate approach, across district lines it serves to exacerbate
unfairness. The answer to overburdening should come from Congress,
either in the form of new judgeships or curtailed jurisdiction. Concededly
congressional reform has been slow in coming in the past, but it seems
to do little good to take the heat off by developing a special assembly
line for general civil cases that must be handled expeditiously to make
way for other cases.
Indeed, the closer one looks the more doubtful the argument becomes.
The advocates of local choice based on local custom or diversity
unfortunately do not offer numerous examples of necessary diversity in
local rules. More often, the argument is stated at a high degree of
generality. When examples are given, however, the practice of
fragmentation appears even odder. For example, Professor Cavanagh
suggests that "minutiae" such as "time limits for filing and responding
to motions, the form and content of briefs, the content of final pretrial
orders, and whether the court will entertain oral argument on motions,"
is not the stuff of federal rules, and "by and large ... turn on local
custom." 4 ' As long ago as the Knox Committee Report, local rules
were seen as necessary regarding "rules of admission of attorneys to
practice, calendaring motions, and assignment of cases for trial."' 2
It is readily apparent that many of these "minutiae" have the ability
substantially to affect rights, and virtually none of the items is such that

140. Brookings Study, supra note 41, at 11.
141. Cavanaugh, supra note 11, at 731.
142.

REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE CommITrEE ON LOCAL DISTRICT

COURT RULES 11 (1940) at 7-9, quoted in Subrin, supra note 1, at 2017.
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local rules are required. The availability of oral argument, or the time
available to file motions are good examples of rules that can affect an
outcome. The very diverse practices of the federal circuit courts with
regard to oral argument are troubling. Oral argument is important or
it is not; there ought to be some concensus. Surely the importance of
oral argument does not vary by circuit.
Similarly, rules that treat "minutiae" are not (simply for this reason)
appropriate for local variance. We discuss below the problem of whether
and when local rules are necessary to fill the interstices of the federal
rule. Answers may differ depending upon circumstances. But the need
for a set of less weighty rules is not an argument that those rules be
different in every jurisdiction of the country. It is the nature of such
rules that they are numerous and multiply. A danger of the rulemaking
process is that rules become the panacea for every problem. While this
problem must be addressed, it will not help matters to have the problem
addressed in every district. This will only contribute to delay, cost, and
unfairness to out-of-district litigants.
2. Information and Management. Some local rules are justified
as essentially housekeeping matters. For example, some local rules
"simply provideD mundane information for lawyers about how, where,
Stephen Flanders offers this as a
and when the court operates.""
primary and important function of local rules. He cites as examples the
hours of the clerk's office, and rules about case assignment.'" Another
category of rules that Flanders conjoins are rules relating to management, rules that are "essential tools in implementing court policy in
administrative matters."" "Matters such as determining the balance
between 'free press' and 'fair trial' concerns, dismissing cases for failure
to prosecute and interrogating jurors after verdict all involve regulation
of the conduct of lawyers, and are clearly within a court's discretion."'" Simply pointing to housekeeping purposes does not truly
justify local rules, however, as a distinction between Flanders' categories
makes clear. The first category-rules that simply inform-are
unobjectionable, precisely because they are not rules. If they merely
inform, but do not require anything of lawyers, then the provision of
information is commendable. The only question is whether the

143.
144.
145.
146.

Flanders, supra note 137, at 262.
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 218-19.

1995]

FEDERAL RULES

787

147
information needs to be packaged as a "rule."
To the extent that the local rules require conduct of lawyers, however,
these rules-be they for "administrative matters," "management," or
whatever--still are going to implicate the concerns we discuss above.
The labels themselves are, to a certain extent, misleading in that they
mask what might be a very real impact on substantive rights. An
evident example of Mr. Flanders' own is "dismissing cases for failure to
prosecute."14 These rules are rules, and appropriately are covered in
the section immediately following.

3. Interstitial Rules. Many rules are justified on the ground they
are interstitial. Often-times this is explicit, as when Professor Cavanagh
explains that local rules are beneficial when they "fill in the gaps left by
national rules."49 Other times interstitial rules are explained as being
within the district court's discretionary authority. 50 Interstitial rules
prove to be a difficult topic, though less so after some ground is cleared
away.
First, it comes as at least some surprise that there is a debate about
whether local rules in conflict with federal rules should be permitted.
Rule 83 explicitly prohibits this, and for what would seem to be good
reason.' What, after all, is the point of having a national rule if local
districts may deviate at will? Nonetheless, both the CJRA and the 1993
Amendments appear to contemplate local rules inconsistent with
national standards. The CJRA is unclear as to this, but many districts
have adopted plans inconsistent with the federal rules. The 1993
Amendments have an explicit opt-out provision, so in a sense local choice
is not "inconsistent" with the federal rule. In either event the trend is
a bad one, and probably results from an inability to reach concensus on
the national level.
Second, the field of interstitial rules is--or ought to be- markedly
smaller than the "gaps" in the federal rules. One interpretation of

147. Having said this, two related points present themselves. First, obviously any
information also in a sense is a rule. If the clerk's office is open between 9:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.m., then one must file papers between those hours. Second, one reasonably might
question the amount of "information" that really must differ from district to district. Why
not have the clerk's offices open at the same time throughout the country so attorneys do
not need to guess or try to locate the local rule? Despite these two points, we are willing
to assume there is some information (directions to the courthouse?) that is useful to all
lawyers, might differ among districts, and ought to be published.
148. Flanders, supra note 137, at 219.
149. Edward D. Cavanaugh, supra note 11, at 731.
150. See generally Flanders, supra note 137, at 221.
151. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
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interstitial rules might allow for any rule not flat out contradicted by the
federal rules. This, however, is too broad a definition. For example, the
federal rules, until recently, set no limits on interrogatories or depositions. By local rule, however, limits were set in some districts. This
type of local rule strikes us as too fundamentally different in policy from
the federal rules to be taken as "interstitial." Interstitial rules ought to
be those that either fill in the local rules where wide discretion is
granted, or clear up something left unclear by the national rules. An
example might be a local rule setting out the procedure for drafting a
Rule 16 order. Rules of broader scope than this might also be appropriate, but they should be seen for what they are: an attempt to formulate
important new policy. As such, we deal with them below in the section
on experimentation.
With these understandings in mind, we take the general position that
although there might be some narrow compass for interstitial local rules,
such rules still should be the exception. Indeed, we believe that such
rules never should be, permitted to take effect without central approval.
While this position no doubt will be controversial, it rests on wellreasoned views about the appropriate level of case management.
In our view, local rules are the least optimal of possible case management techniques, and result most often from an inability or unwillingness to make case management decisions at the optimal level. Much
rulemaking is simply seen as beneath the dignity of a national rule or
rulemaking body. On the other hand, it is bothersome for a district
judge to have to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. But the result
is decisionmaking at a level calculated to be least efficient.
Take the frequently offered example of establishing page limits on
brief, or other matters about the form and contents of briefs. Whether
the rule should be national or case-by-case may depend upon the type of
brief at stake, but there is little apparent benefit to a local rule. The
circuit courts have their own elaborate rules about contents of briefs and
page limits. The reason for this local choice is unclear, however.
Appellate briefs are similar, and vary little from case to case in their
particulars. That is ' why circuit-wide rules suffice, with exceptions
granted by motion. Yet, there is no reason for rules to differ circuit by
circuit either. This creates inefficiency, expense, and unfairness, all to
no appreciable end. Another example is presumptive discovery limits.
It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that if limits are desirable they
ought to be set on a case-by-case basis. Every case is different. Some
cases may profit from no interrogatories except the most basic, and a
long series of depositions. In other cases a deposition of anyone but the
plaintiff may be unnecessary. But district courts are looking to find a
way to avoid the difficulty of managing discovery on a case-by-case basis.
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Thus, they draft local rules in the hope the rules will solve the problem.
Local rules are a Procrustean bed likely to satisfy no one.
Particularly in light of our discussion about local custom, it should be
clear that rarely if ever should a rule turn on conditions unique to a
district. If a rule is needed it is not too trivial to be promulgated
nationally. If a rule is not needed, it is not needed. By the same token,
cases are different and require differentiated management. By this we
do not mean tracking, which is just an ill-fitting rule of its own. We
mean that most cases require the careful attention of a district judge.
Judges may not like this task. But it will not solve anything to
promulgate one size fits all rules to substitute for individualized case
management.
Having said all this, we concede there may well be examples of rules
that are necessary and appropriate at the local level. We would not seek
to rule them out entirely. But by the same token, we think it essential
to establish a mechanism by which local rules are tested by some entity
other than the local judges who favor the rule. We suggest that
mechanism below.
4. Districts as Laboratories. In a bow to a fashionable rationale
for federalism, one of the most frequent defenses of local rules is that
beneficial national rules are often the product of local reforms. To hear
the story told-and we have no doubt it is a true one in this regard-local judges think up solutions to local problems and adopt them
as local rules, several similar approaches are tried in different places,
then the experiments that seem to work get adopted as national
rules.'62 If local rulemaking is eliminated, critics argue, this process
of experimentation will be lost.
While the "local rules as laboratories for experimentation" has merit
in theory, it runs into serious difficulty in practice. Below we propose a
way in which district courts could be used for true procedural experimentation. But as currently operating, these laboratories are as likely
to yield incorrect results as correct ones. Moreover, there is no reason
that experimentation must operate from the bottom up, and more reason
to believe that in fact it would operate far better from the top down.
What currently passes for experimentation only may do so in the very
loosest sense. Many critics, while applauding in theory the idea of
experimentation before procedural change, nonetheless have been

152. See, e.g., A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of
Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1579 (1991).

790

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

sharply critical of the way in which that experimentation is occurring.' Leo Levin, former director of the Federal Judicial Center, puts
the case succinctly:
7b experiment without paying due regard to the resulting data is an
exercise in self-contradiction. Nor can impressionistic accounts of the
effects of particular pr6cedures substitute for hard data. By the same
token, it is of little use to collect data produced by experiments that are
so poorly or improperly designed that they cannot serve as the proper
basis for solid conclusions. Moreover, it has been wisely said that
where human subjects are involved, a poorly or improperly designed
experiment "is by definition unethical."t '
Levin's comment highlights serious deficiencies in both the front and
back ends of current process. First, the "design" of existing experiments
is extremely poor. For the most part they seem not to be designed at all,
but simply put into operation in districts that want to try something
new. This method of experimentation stands in sharp contrast to, for
example, that suggested by Professor Laurens Walker, who argues that
procedural innovation be tested in true field experiments and quasiexperiments designed to yield valid and significant data."5 Accomplishing this would involve designing experiments to rule out as far as
possible any cause for results other than the innovation being tested, to
establish control groups against which the innovative districts may be
compared, and to ensure to as great an extent as possible that the
results are generalizable to the context in which they will operate.
Professor Walker's description of the process of scientific experimentation indicates why the CJRA, including countless surveys promulgated
by CJRA advisory groups operating with no training in the relevant
techniques, is unlikely to yield valid information.
Second, innovation often is put into operation on the basis of what
ostensibly is data, but for the most part reduces to isolated anecdotes.
The hearings before the Biden Committee on the CJRA stand as a
crowning example. One would hope Congress was not making decisions

153. See, e.g., Levin, supranote 155, at 1581, 1590; Laurens Walker, PerfectingFederal
Civil Rules: A Proposalfor Restricted Field Experiments, 51 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67
(Summer 1988); Linda S. Mullenix, supra note 48, at 403-04.
154. Levin, supra note 155, at 1590.
155. See Walker, supra note 156, at 75-77. See also Deborah R. Hensler, Researching
Civil Justice: Problems and Pitfalls, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 55 (1988) (discussing
difficulties with empirical study of civil justice system); Marc Galanter, Bryant Garth,
Deborah Hensler & Frances Kahn Zemas, Viewpoint: How to Improve Civil Justice Policy,
77 JUDICATURE 185 (1994) (arguing for better data collection on civil justice system
indicator).
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about national procedural innovation based on random stories about
what one judge did with a particular case, or upon vague reports of what
was accomplished in a district with some innovation. Yet a reader of the
hearing transcript is left to almost no other conclusion.
Moreover, experiments should not be designed without some sense of
the difficulty they pose. Many of the problems we identify with
procedural fragmentation necessarily are present when controlled
experimentation occurs. For example, both inefficiencies of differing
procedures across districts and procedural unfairness from different
applicable rules will result. At least in a controlled experiment, however,
there can be attention to minimizing these costs, or to maximizing the
value of data collected while the costs are incurred.
On balance we believe some careful experimentation may be both
commendable and necessary. Particularly in light of procedural change
that seems particularly innovative and far-reaching, it would be better
to test new ideas before using the entire country as a guinea pig. The
adoption of, and changes to, Rule 11, as well as the new mandatory
disclosure rules are examples of procedural innovation that might well
have benefitted from testing before implementation. Experimentation,
however, is hardly an argument for local rules fashioned by local
districts operating on their own. Recall that the argument about
experimentation is offered to support local rulemaking autonomy. But
we believe quite the contrary is true. In an important article Professors
Rubin and Feeley make the point, in the context of discussing the federal
system, that experimentation may be effected best with strong central
control, rather than letting each state go its own way.1" While we
reserve judgment on the Rubin/Feeley argument in the context of
federalism generally, the argument certainly holds sway in the
rulemaking context.
True experimentation should occur with strong central control. There
should be national debate about which experiments to pursue, and
central control to ensure the experiments (to the greatest extent
possible) actually yield results. Much of the difficulty we have identified
with existing stabs at experimentation prevails because districts are
proceeding on their own. From a central standpoint, experiments can be
designed and implemented across districts.
IV. CONCLUSION
As must be evident, we believe the current proliferation of local rules

156. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism& Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910 (1994).
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and the trend to localized reform and innovation is ill-advised. The very
purpose of a system of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was uniformity,
and the case has not been made, nor seriously attempted, to overthrow
that regime. Rather, the trends we observe are all the more disturbing
because they are occurring without careful consideration, or as a matter
of political compromise unrelated to the goals of a functioning procedural
system.
For the most part we believe uniform national rules are a good idea,
and local rules a bad one. Uniformity is desirable for reasons including
efficiency and substantive outcome fairness. Local rules are undesirable
because they interfere with the system of uniformity and by-and-large
offer little real benefit. By the same token, we concede there is some
role for disuniformity in appropriate circumstances. The most prominent
example is probably the need for some controlled experimentation. But
there also may be instances in which local rules are needed to account
for local condition.
Ultimately we believe that a stronger system of central control is
essential to reassert uniformity while dealing with instances in which
local rules are appropriate. While we leave for another day the question
of what that central authority should be, it seems at least initially that
the authority ought to be an adjunct to, and under the control of, the
Judicial Conference. We say that with at least some misgiving, however,
because we are concerned that a body composed entirely of judges may
overvalue anecdotes and opinions about reform and be insufficiently
attentive
both to social science process and to the needs of court
57
users.
At any rate, our proposal is a simple one, with four basic pieces.
1. No local rules should be permitted to go into effect without
approval of the central authority. The criteria for approval should be
whether there is a unique local problem that requires its own rule,
and whether the unique problem is such that solving the problem
justifies the cost of disuniformity.
2. Proposed rules that do not meet the above criteria nonetheless
should be considered for national adoption. We should discard the
157. In this regard we note the current debate about the composition of the Rules
Advisory Committees. It is at least our tentative view that whatever central control there
is ought to have adequate representation by court users as well as judges, with good
assistance from qualified social scientists. We also note the current discussion of whether
the rulemaking process really should be one that follows a pluralistic political model, as
many argue. It again is our tentative view that even if rulemaking should occur in some
other fashion, good rulemaking still may require decisionmakers other than judges, who
may overrule their expertise in procedural reform, and discount the skills of other professionals.
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notion that trivial matters are inappropriate for a national rule. If
there is a needed rule, it should be national in scope. National
rulemakers should carefully consider whether the subject matter of the
proposal should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. If not, and if a
rule is needed but the rule does not deal with a unique local situation,
the solution should be a national rule.
3.
There should be no opting out of federal rules. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure should be uniform and national in scope.
Political pressures should not be resolved by simply deferring
questions to local choice.
4.
Finally, experimentation is to be encouraged on a national
basis, through carefully considered and developed experiments. When
rules deal with significant innovation, the central authority should
consider an experiment. Experimentation necessarily must be limited,
which means proposals will compete against one another. Significant
procedural innovation ought to proceed on the basis of valid data, with
some advance idea of pitfalls and how they can be addressed.
In sum, we believe there may be some place for local rules. But even
that decision should be made nationally. For the most part the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure should be the rules by which all lawyers play.

